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JS THERE A MIND-BODY PROBLEM? 
1. Introduction 
by 
RODERICK CHISHOLM 
The title --"Is There a Mind-Body Problem?"-- will suggest that I have 
doubts as to whether there is a mind-body problem. And I do have doubt.<> as 
to whether there is a specfal problem concerning the relation between the mind 
and the body. You may say: "Well, plenty of people have worried aboutthe 
problem of the relation of the mind and the body. And so therefore there is 
a problem." And of course that is true enough: people have been concerned 
with it. But what I wish to suggest is that they shouldn't have been concerned 
with it: there is no evidence to suggest that I have something to be called a mind 
which we must relate somehow to the body. 
Now. in saying this --there is no reason to suggest that I have something 
to be called a mind-- I do not mean to say that there is no person-body problem. 
If we use "person" to designate such entities as you and me, then there is no 
question but that there are such things as persons. And obviously there is no 
question but that there are such things as our bodies. There is a problem about 
the relation between those entities. Thus there is the question: What is the rela­
tion between me and my body? There are two broad possibilities: Either I am 
identical with my body or I am not identical with it. And if we decide that I 
am not identical with it, then once again there are two possibilities: either I am 
identical with some part of my b6dy or I'm not. And if I'm not, then just what 
kind of thing am I? So there is a person-body problem. 
But I want to urge that we multiply problems beyond necessity if we 
suppose, that in addition to th� person-body problem, there is also a mind­
body problem. In suggesting that there is no mind-body problem, then, I am 
suggesting this: if the substantival expressiOii''mind" is taken to designate some 
individual thing which is other than the person, something that person may be 
said to have, just as it has a hand and a foot, then there is no reason to suppose 
that there is such a thing as the mind; and if there is no reason to suppose that 
there is such. a thing as the mind, then there is no problem about how it may be 
related to the body. 
2. One Case for Minds 
So let us ask, then, "Why assume that there is such a thing.as my mind?" 
This is different from asking "Why assume that there is such a thing as me?" 
And it is also different from asking "Why assume that I have various mental 
properties and potentialities, such as the ability to think or to think in such 
ways?" For the assumption that.! have these mental properties and potentialities 
doesn't imply that I have a mind which has them. 
Why should one suppose that there is a non-material thing which is the mind? 
Aristotle had argued that "that in the soul which is called mind (by mind 
I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) ....  cannot reasonably be regarded 
25 
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as blended with body."1 The mind, he said, must be "capable of receiving the 
form of an object" but without thereby becoming that object.2 And this would 
be impossible if the mind were itself a material thing. 
Aristotle's reasoning was essentially this. (1) If you apprehend a thing 
--say, a dog,-- then you do it by means of something which bears a certain inti­
mate relation to the form or nature of a dog. But (�) a material thing couldn't 
bear the requisite relation to the form or nature of a dog unless the material 
thing were thereby to become itself a dog. On the other hand (3) a non-material 
thing could bear the requisite relation without thereby becoming a dog. Hence 
if you and . I  can apprehend dogs, and of course we can, then it is by means of a 
certain nonmateriaL thing which is our mind. 
What are we to say of this argument? The argument requires a more speci­
fic �riz.ation of the relation in question --the relation that m1.l.5t be born to the fOnn .or 
nature of a dog if one -is to be able to apprehend a dog. Until we have such an 
account, I think we must say that both premise (1) and premise (2) are problem­
atic.3 
Perhaps the most important consideration which may make us wonder 
whether there is a nonmaterial substance which is a mind is the nature of our 
immediate experience --our experience of what are sometimes called "sense-data" 
or "appearances." Let us consider one twentieth century conception of appear­
ances, for this was thought by many to demonstrate an irreducible dualism 
between mind and body. I am referring to the view set forth by A.O. Lovejoy 
in his book, The Revolt Against Dualism. \1930) 
"No man doubts," Lovejoy wrote, 'that when he brings to mind the look 
of a dog he owned when a boy, there is something of a canine sort immediately 
present to and therefore compresent with his consciousness, but that it is quite 
certainly not that dog in the flesh" (p. 305). The thing that is there --the some­
thing of a canine sort that is immediately before the mind-· is not itself a physi­
cal object, Lovejoy said; it is a private, psychological object, conditioned by a 
series of physiological and psychological events, reaching back to the earlier dog 
which it now reveals. 
If the man now looks at his desk, then, according to Lovejoy, there is 
another series of physiological and psychological events, this time involving the 
activity of sense organs, but resulting as before in a private, psychological ob­
ject --a sensation, this time something of a desk sort, a "visible desk" which in 
certain respects serves to duplicate the real, external, physical desk which it 
makes known to us. 
Both of these examples --the earlier dog and the external desk being pre­
sented by an inner visual desk-· provide us with the essentials of two philosophi­
cal theories, which Lovejoy had referred to as "epistemological dualism" and 
psychophysical dualism." According to "epistemological dualism," which is a the 
sis about our knowledge, we have direct or immediate knowledge only of cer­
tain private or subjective states; some external objects, past or present, are "dup­
licated" in th�se private or subjective slates and it is in virtue of this duplication 
that we know what we do about the rest of the world. Our knowledge of exter· 
nal things and of past events involves a "cleavage" between the object of our 
knowing and the subjective vehicle which makes that object known. And accord­
ing to "psychophysical dualism," which is a thesis about reality, the world is 
constituted out of at least two fundamentally different kindF of stuff --the physi­
cal or material things that are studied by physics, and the psychical or mental 
things that are objects of our private or subjective states. When asserted in con-
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junction, as they were by Lovejoy, and in the seventeenth century by Descartes 
and Locke, these two forms of dualism imply that our knowledge of ph yslcai 
or material things is derived from our knowledge of the mental or psychical 
duplicates of these things_ 
Our present interest is in the second of these types of dualism --psycho­
physical dualism, the view that there is a set of mental or psychical entities, 
which are appearances or sense-data and that these psychical entities are housed 
in a psychical place, known as "the mind." 
3. The Sense-Datum Fallacy 
Let us begin by considering those strange entities which are sense-data or 
appearances. 
H was supposed, for example, that if a man were to walk around a table, 
while focusing upon the white tablecloth on the top, he could experience a 
great variety of sense-data or appearances. Some of these entities would be rec­
tangular like the table-top itself; they would be the ones he would sense if he 
were to get his head directly above the table and then look down. Most of them, 
however, would be rhomboids of various sorts. If the lighting conditions were 
good and the man's eyes in proper order, most of the appearances would be 
white, like the table-cloth. But if the man were wearing rose-colored glasses, he 
might sense appearances that were pink, or if he were a victim of jaundice, he 
might sense appearances that were yellow. The other senses, as well as imagina­
tion, were thought to bring us into relation with still other types of appearances 
or sense-datum. 
It was assumed that, if a physical thing appears white or rhomboidal or 
bitter to a man, then the man may be said to sense or to be aware of an appear­
ance that is white, or an appearance that is rhomboidal, or an appearance that 
� bitter. It was assumed that if jl dog presents a canine appearance, then the 
dog presents an appearance that is canine.4 And it was ass.urned, more gener­
ally, that whenever we have a true statement of the form "Such-and-such a physi­
ical thing appears, or looks, or seems so-and-so to Mr. Jones," we can derive 
a true statement of the form "Mr. Jones is aware of an appe_arance which is in fact so-and-so." But this assumption is quite obviously false.5 
Consider the following reasoningt which would be quite sound if the 
assumption were true: "That dog looks vicious and more than 10 years old. 
Therefore he presents an appearance which is vicious and he presents an appear­
ance which is. more than 10 years old." It is absurd to suppose that an appear­
ance, like a dog or a man, may be vicious or more than 10 years old. It is also 
absurd to suppose that an appearance may be a dog --i.e., something of a "can­
ine sort." And, I think, it is equally absurd to suppose that an appearance, like 
a tablecloth, may be rectangular, or pink, or white. 
We should compare the grammer of (a) "I sense a red afpearance," (b) "I have a depressed feeling," and (c) "I have a green Chevrolet.' The sense-datum 
philosopher interprets (a) as though it resembled ( c) more than (b )- But I sug­
gest that it should be taken in such a way that it resembles (b) more than ( c). 
Thus "I have a depressed feeling" should not be taken to say that I have a feel­
ing which is itself depressed. It doesn't predicate reing depressed of a feeling; 
it predicates feeling depressed of a person. And " sense a canine appearance" 
doesn't predicate canninity of an appearance. It predicates b�ing appeared to 
in-a-certain-way to me. I'm appeared to in a way which is optimal for the per-
27 
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ception of dogs. Being appeared to is an undergoing --a non relational quality 
of the person. 
And so, if what we have said is correct, then one of Lovejoy's arguments 
for 
L
sychoph
ffi
sical dualism --the dualism of mind and body-- is inconclusive. 
For ove1oy ad argued: (1) We see desks and stars and other objects by means 
of internal desks and stars which are not identical with the objects they enable 
us to perceive; but (2) no place among physical objects can be found for such 
internal desks and stars; therefore ( 3) the latter objects inhabit "the world of 
the mind" and not "the world of matter." But if premise (1) is false, this argu­
ment for psychophysical dualism is no longer available. Since there are no inter­
nal desks and stars, the materialists need not be asked to find a placefor them. 
(But he must, of course, fit the fact of ap
fr
aring into his scheme of things.) 
But does this settle the matter? What i being sad and being appeared red 
to are undergoings --and not relations between persons and sense-data? Isn't 
there something special about these undergoings? After all, they seem to give 
the world a "qualitative dimension" it might otherwise not have.6 And isn't 
this qualitative dimension a mental or psychical aspect of the world? 
Let us try to do justice to this. In particular, let us consider what has 
sometimes been called the "double aspect" theory. I think that those who spoke 
this way may have been on the right track. 
4. The Daylight View of Matter 
The property of 
\
eing depressed, I have said, is not a property of a feel­
ing and the property of eing red is not a property of a sense-datum. But feeling 
depressed and bfilng ap�
eared to redl
S 
are properties of the person --they are 
nonrelational qu ities o the person. o, too, for those other properties which 
present us with "a qualitative dimension of being." They are all "modifications" 
of the subject of experience. 
But if the subject of experience thus exhibits a "qualitative dimension of 
being," then doesn't the subject have certain mental properties thereby? And 
doesn't this mean that the subject --the person-- is a mind? 
I.t may be natural to say that such a qualitiative dimension is "mental," 
and this statement is harmless enough if "mental" is taken to mean the same as 
"that which is known immediately." For being appeared to ls mental in that 
respect: roughly speaking, it can't happen to you unless you ""know that it is 
happening to you. But this use of the adjective "mental" should not be taken 
to suggest the substantive "mind ." There is no reason to suppose that only 
minds can have mental properties in this sense of the word "mental." It is pos­
sible that, in this sense of "mental," physical things may have properties that 
are "mental." Or to put the matter more carefully, it is possible that there are 
things ·having properties that are physical and also having properties that are 
mental. 
These remarks will recall what has sometimes been called "the double 
aspect theory." The theory may be put by saying that persons have "inner" 
and 44outer" aspects. The "inner" aspects are "mental"; that is to say, they are 
those subjective and intentional properties which are necessarily such that, if a 
�rson has them, then it is evident to the person that he has them. And the 
'outer" aspects are certain physical properties. 
It is essential not to confuse this use of the expression "double aspect" 
with certain other uses that the expression has been given in recenL philosophy. 
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Thus we are using it for the view according to which certain individual things 
--namely persons-- have both "mental" and "physical" properties. But it has also 
been used for the view according to which there are certain events or activities 
having both mental and physical properties.7 The latter view is quite different 
from the one that I have suggested. (Obviously, it would be a category mistake 
of the . most egregious kind to identify persons with events or activities.) The 
expression "double aspect" theory has also been used for the so-called identity­
theory, jlccording to which "mental events" are to be identified with "physical 
events."8 But "the double aspect theory," as I use this term, refers to a theory 
about the nature of persons and not to a theory about events. 
Th� double aspect view has been clearly set forth by Gustav Theodor 
Fechner.� Thus he held that we are "to ourselves" psychical and "to others" 
material. The important point of his doctrine, it seems to me, is the assertion 
that we are both mental and material. For the assertion implies that what is 
material can also be mental. A material thing can be "intrinsically psychical.'' 
Perhaps we could accept this conclusion without holding, as Fechner did, 
that all matter is intrinsically psychical. But if some material things are intrin­
sically psychical, what about the others? What could their intrinsic proper­
ties be? Do we know of any intrinsic properties other than those we have been 
calling psychical? Or is it possible that only some individual things have intrinsic 
properties and hence that others have no intrinsic properties? 
The word "intrinsic" has two senses here. One is suggested by the con­
cept of "self-presentation"; Fechner says that certain things are "psychical to 
themselves," and this means that they have certain states that "present them­
selves." The other sense of "intrinsic" is that of nonrelational: an intrinsic pro­
perty of a thing would be a property not entailing relations of the thing to other 
things. 
Fechner called this the "daylight view" (die Tagesansicht) of matter and 
contrasted it with the "night view" of matter.10-
The "double aspect theory" tells us this: There are certain things which 
have physical properties and therefore physica1 objects; some of these things also 
have certain mental or intentional properties; and persons --you and I-- are such 
things as these. 
C.A. Strong put this last point clearly. He wrote: 
I am to outer appearance physical but to inner perception psychica1; 
There is therefore no contradiction in a thing being at once physical , 
that is, extended, composed of parts, productive of effects, and 
psych"ical, that is of the nature of feeling.11 
Strong is not here saying that ,"my mind" is an aspect of a physical thing, much 
less that !_am an aspect of a physical thing. What he says is that there is a certain 
physical thing which has inner and outer aspects and that that physical thing is 
identical with me. "-
5. "Which Physical Thing Am I?" 
If we were to accept this theory, then we could ask: "Which physical 
thing am I?" I am afraid we could not provide a precise answer to this question 
If I am in fact a physical thing, then, it should be obvious, that physical 
thing is either this gross physical body now standing before you or it is some 
29 
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proper part of this gross physical body. There are, of course, many philosophical 
arguments professing to s!how that the person cannot be identical with his gross 
macroscopic physical body. Some of these arguments, I think, are sound --in 
particular those appealing to certain facts about persistence through time. 
The body that persists through time --the one I have been carrying with 
me, so to speak-- is an ens successivum. That is to say, it is an entity which is 
made up of different things at different times. The set of things that mak e it 
up today is not identical. with the set of things that made it up yesterday or 
with the set of things that made it up the day before. Now one could say that 
an ens successivum has different "stand-ins,, at different times and that these 
stand-ins do duty for the successive entity at the different times. Thus the thing 
that does duty for my body today is other than the thing that did duty for it 
yesterday and other than the thing that will do duty for it tomorrow. But what 
of me? 
Am 1. an entity such that different things do duty for me at different 
days? Is it one thing that does my feeling depressed for me today and another 
thing that di<r it yesterday and still another thing that will do it t.oolorrow'? If I 
happen to be feeling sad, then, surely, there is no other thing that is doing my 
feeling sad for me. We must reject the view that persons are thus entia successiva. 
Our reasoning can be summarized. Suppose (i) that I am now sad. Now 
(ii)if there is an ens successivum that bears my name and is now sad, then it is 
sad in virtue of tne fact that one of its stand-ins is now sad. But (iii) I am not 
sad in virtue of the fact that some other thing is doing my feeling sad for me. 
Therefore (iv) I am not an ens successivum. 
What would be an ens rronsuccessivum? If an individual thing were a non­
successive entity, what would it be like? If an ens successivum is an individual 
thing that is made up of different things at dTrrerent times, then an � non­
successivum would be an individual thing that is not made up of different thmgs 
at different times. This means that, at any moment of its e)Qstence, it has pre­
cisely the same parts it has at any other moment of its existence; at no time 
during which it exists, does it have a part it does not have at any other time 
during which it exists. 
It is tempting to reason, in Leibnizian fashion: "There are entia success­
iva. Therefore there am entia nonsuccessiva." I believe ttm reasoning is sound. 
Twould add, moreover, that every extended period of time, however short, is 
such that some ens nonsuccessivum exists during some part of that time. For I 
believe it is onlyby presupposing this thesis that we can make sense of the 
identity or 'persistence of fil!.Y individual thing through time. 
Might I not be, then, such an l?rn noogirees;ivlnn? Leibniz mentions --and 
rejects-- a theory which is similar to this. "The soul," he says, "does not dwell 
in certain atoms ap?ropriated to itself, nor in a little incorruptible bone such 
as the Luz of the Rabbis."12 Of course, the hypothesis I have suggested, if 
filled in by reference to such a material thing as the Luz bone, would not imply 
that "the soul" dwells there -if the soul is understood to be something other 
than the person, still another thing that the person "has." We would be saying 
rather that the person dwells there. And to say that he "dwells" there would be 
to say that the person is the Luz bone or some proper part of it. 
If we accept this theory, then, of course, we part company with personal­
ism. The doctrine that persons are physical things --even intactly persisting 
physical things- would not have been taken seriously by Borden Parker Bowne 
and his followers. Yet, if we view the person in the way I have suggested, we 
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may go on to affirm many of the other philosophical theses that the personal­
ists felt to be important. Thus we could say, as Bishop Butler did, that "our 
gross organized bodies with which we perceive the objects of sense, and with 
which we act, are no part of ourselves ... We see with our eyes in the same way 
we see with our glasses.»13 The eyes are the ol�tss of sight, not the subject of sight. We could say, as Butler and the persona 1s did, that the destruction of 
the gross physical body does not logically imply the destruction of the person. 
And we could accept the view that St. Thomas attributes to Plato: the person 
is "in a body in somewhat the same way as a sailor is in a ship."14 
6_ Some Objections Considered 
To understand the view that is being proposed, let us formulate certain 
objections that readily come to mind and then attempt fo reply to them. I will 
consider four such objectiorts. 
(1) "The hypothesis you are considering implies, then, that there is a 
kind of matter that is incorruptible and that the person is a material thing of 
that sort? But this is hardly adequate to the facts of physics." 
The reply is that the theory does not imply that there is certain matter 
that is incorruptible. It implies rather that there are certain material things --in 
all probability, certain material particles or subparticles-- that are incorrupted 
and remain incorrupted as Jong as the person survives. 
The theory would be, then, that I am literally identical with some proper 
part of this macroscopic body, some intact, nonsuccessive part that has been in 
this larger body all along. This part is hardly likely to be the Luz bone, of 
course; more likely, it would be something of a microscopic nature, and pre­
sumably something that is located within the brain. 
(2) "Persons, being thinking things, must have a complex structure. But 
no microscopic entity that is known to physics has the equipment that is neces­
sary for thinking. After all, you �·t think unless you have a brain. And those 
little things don't have brains!" 
The hypothesis being aiticized is the hypothesis that .!. am such a micro­
scopic entity. But note that I do have a brain. And therefore, according to the 
hypothesis in question, the microscopic entity has one, too --the same one that 
I have, the one that is inside my head. It is only a confusion to suppose that the 
microscopic entity --which may in fact be inside my brain- has another brain 
which is in fact inside of it.lf> 
The brain is the orcan of consciousnes , not the s�wect of consciousness 
--unless I am myself my rain.16 The nose, similarly, is e organ of smell and 
not the subject of smell-· unless I am myself my nose. But if I am one or the 
other --the brain or the nose-- then, I the subject, will have some organs that are 
spatial ly outside me. 
The hypothesis in question, then, is that I am a certain proper part of my 
brain. This would imply that the subject of consciousness is a proper part of the 
organ of consciousness. 
( 3) "You say I'm identical with some microscopic particle or some sub­
particle. But I am 6 feet tall and weigh 175 pounds. Therefore your theory would 
imply that there is a certain microscopic particle which is 6 feet tall and weighs 
175 pounds. But this is absurd and therefore your theory is absurd." 
The argument, of course, errs in taking too literally the premise expressed 
by saying "I am 6 feet tall and weigh 17 5 pounds." For what the premise act­
ually tells us is that I have a body which is 6 feet tall and weighs 175 pounds. 
31 
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(4) "Do you mean to suggest seriously, then, that instead of weighing 
175 pounds, you may weigh less than a milligram?" The answer has to be yes. 
We must be ready, therefore, to oe ridiculed, for, in this case, even those who 
know better may be unable to resist the temptation. But those who do know 
better will realize that a person can truly say, in one sense, that he weighs 175 
pounds, and in another sense, that he weighs les"SThan a milligram. The form­
ulation of the first statement would be more n�arly accurate (I say "more near­
ly accurate/' not "more nearly correct") if it read : "I have a body that weighs 
175 pounds." 
Speaking in a loose and popular sense, I may attribute to myself certain 
properties of my gross macroscopic body. (And speaking to a filfing station 
attendant I may attribute certain properties of my automobile to myself: "I'm 
down there on the comer of Jay Street without any gasoline." The response 
needn't be: "How, then, can you be standing here?" One might say that the 
property of being down there is one I have "borrowed" from my automobile.) 
But if I am a microscopic part of my gross body, then, strictly and philosophic­
ally, one cannot attribute to me the properties of it. The properties of weighing 
175 pounds and being 6 feet tall are properties I "borrow" from my body. 
Strictly and philosophically, it has them and I do not.17 
7. Conclusion 
What are the poo;i bilities, after all? There are persons. Therefore either the 
person is a physical thing or, as Lovejoy suggests, the person is a nonphysical 
thing. But does anything we know about persons justify us in assuming that per­
sons are non�hysical individual things? 
What i we suppose that the concept of an extended thing presupposes 
the concept of ultimate nonextended things which, somehow, make up the ex­
tended thing? Could we then identify the person with such an unextended thing? 
I believe that this hypothesis would contradict the assumption that persons are 
entia � se. For I could say that the unextended things (boundaries, lines, 
points, surfaces) that aresaidt.obepresupposed by extended things are ontological 
parasites and not instances of entia � se: they depend for their own properties 
upon the extended things which are said to presuppose them.18 
What point would there be in the hypothesis that certain individual things 
have the property of being nonphysical? How could that help us in explaining 
anything ?19 
If I am a physical thing, then the most plausible hypothesis would seem to 
be that I am a proper part of this gross macroscopic body, even if there is no 
way of telling from the "outside" which proper part I happen to be. 
I would suggest that, if this philosophic hypothesis seems implausible to 
you, you try to formulate one that is less implausible. 
9
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15 I have illustrated this confusion in Richard Taylor's Action and Purpose 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 137. 
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